Following Milgrom and Roberts [Econometrica 58(1990), 1255-1278], we offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS * ) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS * is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve out Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS * by means of a "stability" criterion. We show by an example that IESDS * might generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient conditions under which IESDS * preserves the set of Nash equilibria. JEL Classification: C70, C72.
Introduction
Iterated strict dominance is perhaps one of the most basic principles in game theory. The concept of iterated strict dominance rests on the following simple idea: no player would play strategies for which some alternative strategy can yield him/her a greater payoff regardless of what the other players play and this fact is common knowledge. This concept has been used to expound the fundamental conflict between individual and collective rationality as illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma, and is closely related to the global stability of the Cournot-tatonnement process in terms of dominance solvability of games (cf. Moulin 1984; Milgrom and Roberts 1990) . In particular, it has fruitful applications in Carlsson and van Damme's (1993) global games (see
Morris and Shin 2003 for a survey).
A variety of elimination procedures has been studied by game theorists. 1 Among the most interesting questions that have been explored are: Does the order of elimination matter? Is it possible that the iterated elimination process fails to converge to a maximal reduction of a game? What are the sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of maximal reduction? Can a maximal reduction generate spurious Nash equilibria?
In the most general setting (where the number of players can be infinite, strategy sets can be in general topological spaces, and payoff functions can be discontinuous) Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) 
(henceforth DS) investigated the properties of a definition of iterated elimination of (strictly) dom-inated strategies (IESDS). Among others, DS demonstrated that (i) IESDS
is in general an order dependent procedure, (ii) a maximal reduction may fail to exist, and (iii) IESDS can generate spurious Nash equilibria even in "dominance-solvable" games. 2 As DS pointed out, these anomalies and pathologies appear to be rather surprising and somewhat counterintuitive.
DS (2002, p. 2022) concluded that:
The proper definition and role of iterated strict dominance is unclear for games that are not compact and continuous. .. The main purpose of this paper is to offer a definition of IESDS that is suitable for all games, possibly with an arbitrary number of players, arbitrary strategy sets, and arbitrary payoff functions. This definition of IESDS will be denoted by IESDS * (the asterisk * is used to distinguish it from other forms of IESDS). We will show that IESDS * is a well-defined order independent procedure: it yields a unique maximal reduction (see Theorem 1) . This nice property is completely topology-free. For games that are compact and continuous, our IESDS * yields the same maximal reduction as DS's definition of IESDS (see Theorem 2) . We also provide a characterization of IESDS * in terms of a "stability" criterion (see Theorem 3).
The IESDS * proposed in this paper is based mainly upon Milgrom and
Roberts' (1990, pp. 1264-1265) definition of IESDS in a general class of su-permodular games, 3 and has two major features: (1) IESDS * allows for an uncountable number of rounds of elimination, and is thus more general than DS's IESDS procedure, and (2) in each round of elimination, IESDS * allows for eliminating dominated strategies (possibly by using strategies that have previously been eliminated), rather than eliminating only those strategies that are dominated by some uneliminated strategy. These two features endow the IESDS * procedure with greater elimination power than DS's IESDS procedure.
The rationale behind the two features of IESDS * is as follows. Recall that a prominent justification for IESDS is "common knowledge of rationality"; see, e.g., Bernheim (1984) , Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 4), Pearce (1984) , and Tan and Werlang (1988) . While the equivalence between IESDS and the strategic implication of "common knowledge of rationality" has been established for games with compact strategy spaces and continuous payoff functions (see Bernheim 1984 , Proposition 3.1), Lipman (1994) demonstrated that, for a more general class of games, there is a non-equivalence between countably infinite iterated elimination of never-best replies and "common knowledge of rationality". In particular, he showed that the equivalence can be restored by "removing never best replies as often as necessary" (p. 122), i.e., by allowing for an uncountably infinite iterated elimination of never-best replies (see Lipman 1994 , Theorem 2). Therefore, it seems fairly natural and desirable to define IESDS for general games by allowing for an 3 it can be shown that, in this class of games, for any dominated strategy, there is some remaining uneliminated strategy that dominates it (see DS's Lemma, p. 2012). 5 However, for more general games, the second feature of IESDS *
gives it more elimination power than DS's IESDS procedure.
To see this, consider a simple one-person game where the strategy space is (0, 1) and the payoff function is u (x) = x for every strategy x. (This game is also described in DS's Example 5, p. 2011.) Clearly, every strategy is a never-best reply and is dominated only by a dominated strategy. Eliminate 4 Formally, given any product subset b S of strategy profiles, Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p. 1265) defined the set of player i's undominated responses to b S as including strategies of i that are undominated by not only uneliminated strategies, but also by previously eliminated strategies. From the viewpoint of learning theory, the second feature of IESDS * can be "justified" by Milgrom and Roberts' (1990, p. 1269) adaptive learning process, where each player will never play a strategy for which there is another strategy, from the player's strategy space, that would have done better against every combination of the other players' strategies in the recent past plays. 5 Chen and Luo (2003, Lemma 5) showed a similar result. Milgrom and Roberts (1996, Lemma 1, p. 117) proved an analogous result which allows for dominance by mixed strategy.
in round one all strategies except a particular strategy x in (0, 1). Under DS's IESDS procedure, x survives DS's IESDS and is thus a "spurious Nash equilibrium." Under our IESDS * , in round two, x is further eliminated, and thus our maximal reduction yields an empty set of strategies, indicating (correctly)
that the game has no Nash equilibrium. This makes sense since x cannot be justified as a best reply (and hence cannot be justified by any higher order knowledge of "rationality"). 6 Consequently, this example shows that eliminating dominated strategies, rather than eliminating only those strategies that are dominated by some uneliminated strategy or by some undominated strategy, is a very natural and desirable requirement for a definition of IESDS in general games; see also our Example 2 in Section 2.
We also study the relationship between Nash equilibria and IESDS * . Example 4 in Section 3 demonstrates that, even with its strong elimination power, our IESDS * might generate spurious Nash equilibria. In particular, the game in Example 4 is in the class of Reny's (1999) better-reply secure games, which have regular properties such as compact and convex strategy spaces, as well as quasi-concave and bounded payoff functions. We do obtain 6 The conventional notion of rationality requires that an individual's choice be optimal within the feasible choice set given his information; see Aumann (1987) , Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) , Bernheim (1984) , Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) , Epstein (1997) , and Tan and Werlang (1988) . In the case of finite games with continuous payoff functions, it is easy to see that n-level justifiable * strategy (meaning a player's choice is optimal in the player's feasible strategy set for some belief about the opponents' (n − 1)-level justifiable * strategies) coincides with n-level justifiable strategy (meaning a player's choice is optimal in the player's (n − 1)-level justifiable strategy set for some belief about the opponents' (n − 1)-level justifiable strategies); see Pearce (1984, Proposition 2) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Proposition 61.2). This coincidence makes it possible to define an alternative iteration for finite games by gradually reduced subgames. However, Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Definitions 54.1 and 55.1) define rationalizability by the standard "best responses" over the set of all feasible strategies.
positive results: if the best replies are well defined, then no spurious Nash equilibria appear under IESDS * . In particular, no spurious Nash equilibria appear in one-person or "dominance solvable" games (see Theorem 4). Moreover, no spurious Nash equilibria appear in many games that arise in economic applications (see Corollary 4).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers the definition of IESDS * and investigates its properties. Section 3 studies the relationship between IESDS * and Nash equilibria. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks. To facilitate reading, all the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
IESDS *
Throughout this paper, we consider a strategic game
where N is an arbitrary set of players, for each i ∈ N, X i is an arbitrary set of player i's strategies, and u i :
X ≡ Π i∈N X i is the joint strategy set. A strategy profile x * ∈ X is said to be a Nash equilibrium if for every i,
In the literature, especially in the case of finite games, a dominated (pure) strategy is normally defined by the existence of a mixed strategy that generates a higher expected payoff against any strategy profile of the opponents. In this paper, we follow DS in defining, rather conservatively, a dominated (pure) strategy by the existence of a (pure) strategy that generates a higher payoff against any strategy profile of the opponents. The two definitions of dominance are equivalent for games where strategy spaces are convex; for instance, mixed extensions of finite games. Borgers (1993) provided an interesting justification for "pure strategy dominance" by viewing players' payoff functions as preference orderings over the pure strategy outcomes of the game.
The following example illustrates that for some games, our IESDS * (a formal definition of which will be given below) yields a maximal reduction containing all Nash equilibria (in this case, a singleton) only after an uncountably infinite number of rounds. (This is unlike Lipman's (1994) Example and DS's Examples 3 and 6, which can be remedied to yield a maximal reduction by performing a second countable elimination after a first countable elimination.)
where
, and for all x i , x j ∈ [0, 1], i, j = 1, 2, and leads to a unique uncountable elimination, which leaves only the greatest element 1 for each player. Definition. An iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS * )
is defined as a finite, countably infinite, or uncountably infinite family
and
The above definition of IESDS * does not require the elimination of all dominated strategies in each round of elimination. That is, we do not require that for every λ,
This flexibility raises an important question: does the IESDS * procedure yield a unique maximal reduction? Without imposing any topological condition on the games, we show that IESDS * is always a well-defined order independent procedure and D is nonempty if a Nash equilibrium exists. Formally, we have:
9 Example 1 also illustrates that DS's IESDS procedure may fail to yield a maximal reduction. DS's Theorem 1 on existence and uniqueness of maximal reduction relies on the game G being a compact and continuous game, which is not the case in our example (because it is impossible to find a topology on [0, 1] such that G is a compact and continuous game). 10 An ordinal Λ is a well-ordered set in the order-isomorphic sense (see, e.g., Suppes 1972, p. 129). A limit ordinal is an element in Λ which is not a successor. As usual, we use λ 0 < λ to means that "λ 0 precedes λ."
Theorem 1 D uniquely exists. Moreover, D is nonempty if the game G has a Nash equilibrium.
An immediate corollary of the proof of Theorem 1 is as follows:
Corollary 1. Every Nash equilibrium survives both IESDS * and DS's IESDS procedures.
In contrast to DS's IESDS, our IESDS * does not require that, in each round of elimination, the dominator of an eliminated strategy be some uneliminated strategy. However, the following result asserts that, for the class of games where strategy spaces are compact (Hausdorff) and payoff functions are uppersemicontinuous in own strategies, any maximal reduction of G using DS's IESDS procedure yields a joint strategy set identical to our D. Thus, our IESDS * extends DS's IESDS to arbitrary games. Let H denote a maximal reduction of G in the DS sense, i.e., a set of strategy profiles resulting from using DS's IESDS procedure. Formally, we have:
Theorem 2 For any compact and own-uppersemicontinuous game, H = D if H exists. Moreover, for any compact (Hausdorff) and continuous game,
The following example demonstrates that outside the class of compact and own-uppersemicontinuous games, D could be very different from a unique H that results from a well-defined "fast" IESDS procedure in the DS sense.
Example 2. Consider a two-person symmetric game:
where N = {1, 2}, X 1 = X 2 = [0, 1], and for all x i , x j ∈ [0, 1], i, j = 1, 2, and i 6 = j (cf. Fig. 1 ) In this game it is easy to see that any strategy x i in [0, 1/2) is dominated
. After eliminating all these dominated In fact, (1, 1) is the unique Nash Equilibrium, which could also be obtained with the "iterated elimination of never-best replies" (cf., e.g., Bernheim 1984; Lipman 1994).
In this game, the payoff function u i (., x j ) is not uppersemicontinuous since
We end this section by providing a characterization of IESDS * by means of a "stability" criterion. A subset K ⊆ X is said to be a stable set if K = {x ∈ X| x i is not dominated given K}; cf. Luo (2001, Definition 3).
Theorem 3 D is the largest stable set.
The following result is an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. Given a game G, DS's IESDS is order independent if every
H is a stable set. 
IESDS * and Nash Equilibrium
As Nash (1950, p. 292) pointed out, "no equilibrium point can involve a dominated strategy". Nash equilibrium is clearly related to the notion of dominance. In this section we study the relationship between Nash equilibrium and IESDS * .
We have shown in Corollary 1 that every Nash equilibrium survives IESDS * and hence remains a Nash equilibrium in the reduced game after the iterated elimination procedure. 
It is easily verified that
that cannot be further reduced, where u i | D is the payoff function u i restricted on D. Clearly, D is the set of Nash equilibria in the reduced game G| D since u i | D is a constant function. However, it is easy to see that the set of Nash equilibria in game G is {x ∈ D| x 1 , x 2 / ∈ (2/3, 5/6)}. Thus, IESDS * generates spurious Nash equilibria x ∈ D where some x i ∈ (2/3, 5/6).
Remark. Example 4 belongs to Reny's (1999) class of games for which a
Nash equilibrium exists (in this class of games, the player set is finite, the strategy sets are compact and convex, payoff functions are quasi-concave in own strategies, and a condition called "better-reply security" holds). To see that game G in Example 4 belongs to Reny's class of games, let us check the better-reply secure property. Recall that better-reply security means that "for every non equilibrium strategy x * and every payoff vector limit u * resulting from strategies approaching x * , some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u * i even if the others deviate slightly from x * (Reny 1999, p.
1030)". Let > 0 be sufficiently small. We consider the following two cases: 1) .
by choosing a strategy x * i + , since for any x j that deviates slightly from 1/2,
Moreover, the player set is finite, strategy set X i = [0, 1] is compact and convex, and payoff function u i (·, x j ) is quasi-concave and bounded. This example shows that IESDS * might generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games.
We next provide sufficient conditions under which IESDS * preserves the set of Nash equilibria. Consider a game G ≡ ¡ N, {X i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N ¢ . We say that G has "well-defined best replies" if for every i ∈ N and for every
x −i ∈ X −i , there exists x i ∈ X i that maximizes u i (., x −i ). We say that G is "dominance-solvable" if IESDS * leads to a unique strategy choice for each player. 11 The following Theorem 4 asserts that (i) IESDS * cannot generate spurious Nash equilibria if the game has well-defined best replies, and that
(ii) for one-person games and for dominance-solvable games, the set of Nash equilibria is identical to the set D generated by our IESDS * . Formally, let N E denote the set of Nash equilibria in G, and let N E| D denote the set of Nash equilibria in the reduced game
We can then state: Example 5 (Cournot competition with outside wager). Consider a three-
, and for all x 1 , x 2 , and
, and
This game is dominance-solvable since our IESDS * yields (1/3, 1/3, α), which is the unique Nash equilibrium. By contrast, DS's IESDS procedure fails to give a maximal reduction since no countable sequence of elimination can eliminate the strategy β for player 3.
We close this section by listing the "preserving Nash equilibria" results for our IESDS * in some classes of games commonly discussed in the literature.
These results follow immediately from Theorem 4(i). 
(i) (Debreu 1952; Fan 1966; Glicksberg 1952 ). X i is a nonempty, convex, and compact Hausdorff topological vector space; u i is quasiconcave on X i and continuous on X i × X −i .
(ii) (Dasgupta and Maskin 1986) . N is a finite set; X i is a nonempty, convex, and compact space in a finite-dimensional Euclidian space; u i is quasi-concave on X i , uppersemicontinuous on X i × X −i , and graph continuous.
(iii) (Topkis 1979; Vives 1990; Milgrom and Roberts 1990) . G is a supermodular game such that X i is a complete lattice; and u i is order upper-semi-continuous on X i and is bounded above.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented a new notion of IESDS for general games, denoted by IESDS * and reflecting common knowledge of rationality. We show that IESDS * is always a well-defined order independent procedure, and that it can be used to identify Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games; e.g., the Cournot competition, Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products, and the arms-race games. Many game theorists do not recommend iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) as a solution concept, and one important reason is that order matters for that procedure in some games (see, e.g., Marx and Swinkels 1997 Proof. Assume, in negation, that for some y ∈ D and some i, y i is dominated given D. Thus, D → D\ {y} 6 = D, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2 For any
Proof. Let y i be a strategy that is dominated given
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 1. Proof of Theorem 1. For any Y ⊆ X define the "next elimination" operation ∇ by
The existence of a maximal reduction using IESDS * is assured by the follow- 
. Let x * be a Nash equilibrium. Since for every i, x * i is not dominated given {x * }, by Lemma 2, x * ∈ D λ for all λ.
Corollary 1. Every Nash equilibrium survives both IESDS * and DS's IESDS procedures. Proof. Let H be the maximal reduction resulting from an IESDS procedure in the DS sense. Since every strategy that is dominated by an uneliminated strategy is a dominated strategy, by Theorem 1, the unique D ⊆ H. By the proof of Theorem 1, every Nash equilibrium survives D and hence, survives H. (i) (Debreu 1952; Fan 1966; Glicksberg 1952 ). X i is a nonempty, convex, and compact Hausdorff topological vector space; u i is quasiconcave on X i and continuous on X i × X −i .
Proof. By the Generalized Weierstrass Theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 1999, 2.40 Theorem), the best replies are well-defined for the compact and own-uppersemicontinuous games. By Milgrom and Roberts' (1990) Theorem 1, the best replies are well-defined for the supermodular games in which strategy spaces are complete lattices. By Theorem 4(i), IESDS * preserves the (nonempty) set of Nash equilibria for these classes of games in Corollary 4.
